Apollonian
Guest Columnist
Book Review: "Retreat to Victory? Confederate Strategy Reconsidered," by Tanner
(Apollonian, 29 April 16)
(Apollonian, 29 April 16)
Robert G. Tanner's book, "Retreat To Victory? Confederate Strategy Reconsidered," Scholarly Resources, Inc., Wilmington, Del. 2001; 148 pages text, xxiii, 162, w. index, provides most important analysis for the Southern strategy during War for Southern Independence. Tanner's discussion compares situation of Southern military forces w. Von Clausewitz's general analysis of strategy and well demonstrates the dire and urgent position of the Confederacy which actually could not afford a Fabian -type strategy, withdrawing, avoiding battle w. Union forces, falling-back to some "interior"--which didn't really exist, for various cogent and difficult-to-deny reasons. The work is especially outstanding as it's short, but quite well-written and most excellently researched and referenced, rather an un-beatable combination. The only defect is failure to analyze the North's weaknesses, but at least the southern weaknesses are thoroughly considered.
Tanner does tremendous work, general analysis based much upon Von Clausewitz, esp. for the link btwn military strategy and the political exigencies, including economics. Thus Southern forces could not retreat too far as the south was agrarian and especially slave -based economy and these had to be defended fm union forces, esp. for retainment of the slave investment, expensive and not easily replaced. Thus Tanner analyzes geographic circumstances, especially, along w. other military and strategic ideas, and further, considers the work of other authors who analyzed southern options and circumstances.
To begin, it's best taking the naval situation into observance, surely one of Tanner's best accomplishments, consisting first of the Union's ocean blockade which was never too effective by itself even towards the end of the war. However, the Union naval superiority was key for transport of regular army troops who were landed and then were able to close the Confederate ports and commerce by means of simple land operations capturing fortifications and cities. The South's leading port of New Orleans, for example, was captured very early in 1862, union forces then enabled to closing the Mississippi River working both fm north and south directions, the trans-Mississippi (Tex., Ark., and Mo.) then rendered practically irrelevant to the rest of the conflict.
But most important and telling was union mastery of the river-ways, thus enabled to penetrating far inland upon the south, esp. fm the northern bases on the Mississippi, moving then to the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers--even before capture of Vicksburg in 1863. Note also the slave population was based upon the inland river system which afforded the North a great strategic advantage for possible threats and Southern necessity of defense. For the slave-based agriculture was the South's chief economic asset, very theme of its existence, what most set it apart fm the North. River communications were far more economical as railways had to be guarded by up to a third of the invading army's forces.
Given then Northern advantage of population, more than two to one in total population, closer to four to one in respective white populations, the South's other resort would have been for war of maneuver which was only marginally successful in the case of Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign of 1862, but not so successful for Kirby-Smith in Kentucky; the fundamental problem was there just wasn't that much room in which to maneuver in the south alone.
Unfortunately, Tanner's work doesn't much consider the Gettysburg campaign, for outstanding example, by which Lee should have gone for the un-defended cities of Harrisburg or Philadelphia, and even Baltimore, and luring Meade's army out of the high-ground and fortifications to a battle of maneuver. For again, it really seems the South had to make things more difficult for the North politically, regardless the damage to the south, if the South seriously had hopes to winning the war, or at least stalemating the North and gaining independence. Thus it was essential for the South to strike the north early and quickly as possible so as to cause most damage, economically and especially politically--this was essential as being placed on defensive was fatal.
Overall, if there is any lacking for the work's analysis, I'd say it would be for considering the North's weaknesses which it had in way of corrupt politics and thus rather weak military leadership, at least at first--the South had to strike at these weaknesses most vigorously in the early part of the war, for a war of attrition was fatal, as it turned out, the South steadily crushed, as by Sherman in 1864-5. So even though somewhat incomplete for fullest analysis, Tanner's work is most informative for accurate picture of Southern strategic problems which were steadily turned to advantage by Northern forces.